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Abstract—Recent discoveries in the field of adversarial ma-
chine learning have shown that Artificial Neural Networks
(ANNs) are susceptible to adversarial attacks. These attacks cause
misclassification of specially crafted adversarial samples. In light
of this phenomenon, it is worth investigating whether other types
of neural networks are less susceptible to adversarial attacks. In
this work, we applied standard attack methods originally aimed
at conventional ANNs, towards stochastic ANNs and also towards
Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs), across three different datasets
namely MNIST, CIFAR-10 and Patch Camelyon. We analysed
their adversarial robustness against attacks performed in the
raw image space of the different model variants. We employ a
variety of attacks namely Basic Iterative Method (BIM), Carlini
& Wagner L2 attack (CWL2) and Boundary attack. Our results
suggests that SNNs and stochastic ANNs exhibit some degree of
adversarial robustness as compared to their ANN counterparts
under certain attack methods. Namely, we found that the Bound-
ary and the state-of-the-art CWL2 attacks are largely ineffective
against stochastic ANNs. Following this observation, we proposed
a modified version of the CWL2 attack and analysed the impact
of this attack on the models’ adversarial robustness. Our results
suggest that with this modified CWL2 attack, many models are
more easily fooled as compared to the vanilla CWL2 attack, albeit
observing an increase in L2 norms of adversarial perturbations.
Lastly, we also investigate the resilience of alternative neural
networks against adversarial samples transferred from ResNet18.
We show that the modified CWL2 attack provides an improved
cross-architecture transferability compared to other attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Second generation neural networks have been empirically
successful in solving a plethora of tasks. The different variants
of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) have been used in appli-
cations namely providing authenticating services [1], detecting
anomalous behaviours in cyber-physical systems [2], image
recognition [3], or simply playing a game of Go [4].
However, in 2013, the first research was performed show-
ing that ANNs were vulnerable to adversarial attacks [5], a
phenomenon that involves the creation of specially perturbed
samples from their original counterparts, imperceptible upon
visual inspection, which can be misclassified by ANNs. Since
then, many researchers introduced other adversarial attack
methods against such ANN models, whether under a white-
box [6]–[10] or a black-box [11], [12] scenario. This raises
questions about the reliability of ANNs, which can be a cause
for concern especially when used in cyber-security or mission
critical contexts. [13], [14].
Recently, a third generation of neural networks from the
field of computational neuroscience, namely Spiking Neural
Networks (SNNs), has been researched upon as a means to
model the biological properties of the human brain more
closely as compared to their second generation ANN coun-
terparts. In contrast to ANNs, SNNs train on spike trains
rather than image pixels or a set of predefined features. There
have been different variants of SNNs, differing in terms of the
learning rule used (whether through standard backpropagation
[15]–[17] or via Spike-Timing-Dependent Plasticity (STDP)
[18]–[20]) or the architecture. In this work, we focused on the
STDP-based learning variant of SNNs.
Stochastic ANNs have also been used to perform image
classification tasks. In this work, we focused on two sub-
categories of such stochastic ANNs, one involving making
both its hidden weights and activations are in a binary state
[21], while the other only requiring its hidden activations to
be binary [22]–[24]. These variants of networks use Bernoulli
distributions in order to binarize its features.
Since there are strong evidences showcasing the weaknesses
of ANNs to adversarial attacks, we question if there exists
alternative variants of neural networks that are inherently less
susceptible to such a phenomenon. In this work, we have
decided to turn our attention to analysing the resilience of both
SNN and stochastic ANN variants against adversarial attacks.
The authors in [25] gave a preliminary study of investigating
the adversarial robustness of two variants of SNNs that employ
the use of gradient backpropagation during training, namely
ANN-to-SNN conversion [16] and also Spike-based training
[15]. The authors examined the robustness of the SNNs, and
also a VGG-9 model in the white-box and black-box settings.
They concluded that SNNs trained directly on spike trains
are more robust to adversarial attacks as compared to SNNs
converted from their ANN counterparts. However, in their ex-
periments, the authors performed their attacks on intermediate
spike representations of images, which is the result of passing
images through a Poisson Spike Generation phase followed
by rate computation. Though their work shows preliminary
results on the robustness of SNNs, we find that their sim-
plified approach of constructing adversarial samples yields
unrelatable deviations between the natural and their adversarial
counterparts in the image space. Also, they investigate variants
of SNNs that are trained via backpropagation. We attempt to
address those points in our work, by focusing on STDP-based
learning SNNs and also constructing adversarial samples in
the input space. To the best of our knowledge, we did not find
prior work examining the adversarial robustness of networks
employing the use of BSNs, though there exists works that
explored adversarial attacks against Binary Neural Networks
(BNNs) [26], [27]. The authors in [26] performed two white-
box attacks and a black-box attack (the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [6], CWL2 and the transferability from a
substitute model procedure proposed by [28]) and showed
that stochasticity in binary models do improve the robustness
against attacks.
Unlike [25], we examined two very recent works in the
field of SNN: the Multi-Class Synaptic Efficacy Function-
based leaky-integrate-and fire neuRON (MCSEFRON) model
[20] and Reward-modulated STDP spike-timing-dependent
plasticity in deep convolutional network proposed in [29].
For the remaining of this paper, we would like to refer to
the latter model as SNNm for notation simplicity. For our
stochastic ANN variants, we used Binary Stochastic Neurons
(BSN) to give our models binarized activations in a stochastic
manner. Also, we used Binarized Neural Networks (BNN) that
binarizes weights and activations as our second variant of the
stochastic ANN. We used the vanilla ResNet18 model as a
bridge across the different variants of neural networks.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
1) We analyse to what extent conventional adversarial
attacks (white-box and black-box) can be performed in
the original image space against SNNs with different
information encoding schemes. This is of interest as it
includes networks not trained with backpropagation.
2) We shed light on the effectiveness of adversarial attacks
against stochastic neural network models. In order to
provide a reasonable comparison across the models, we
employed the vanilla ResNet18 CNN as a baseline.
3) We propose an augmented version of a state-of-the-art
white-box attack, CWL2, and analyse the robustness of
the different network variants to samples generated via
such attacks.
4) We investigate the susceptibility of alternative variants of
neural networks are against transferred adversarial sam-
ples across architectures, constructed from ResNet18.
5) As a last novel contribution we measure the efficiency
of attacks against stochastic mixtures of different ar-
chitectures. Given the availability of different variants
of neural networks, a stochastic mixture of them is an
imaginable defense mechanism which does not rely on
detecting adversarials.
The remaining of our paper is organised in the following
manner. We start off with details of the attacks we used, also
providing brief introduction to SNNs and stochastic ANNs
in Section II. In Section III, we discuss our experimental
setup and also our findings. This is followed by a discussion
of attacking stochastic architecture mixtures in Section IV,
should such a defence mechanism be employed. After which,
in Section V, we provide some discussion points with regards
to stochastic ANNs. Finally, we conclude our work in Section
VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Adversarial Attacks Against Neural Networks
The concept of adversarial examples were first introduced
by [5]. The authors demonstrated that misclassification of
ANNs were possible by adding a set of specially crafted
perturbations to an image, albeit imperceptible upon visual
inspection. Following their work, several other researchers
explored various methods to launch adversarial attacks in an
attempt to further evaluate the robustness of ANNs. One of
which was the FGSM, where it uses the sign of the gradients
that were computed from the loss with respect to the input
space, to perform a single-step perturbations on the input itself.
They adopted the same loss function that was used to train the
image classifier to obtain the gradients. Several studies [7], [8]
extended this attacking technique by applying the algorithm to
the input image sample for multiple iterations to construct a
stronger adversarial sample. Currently, however, the Carlini
& Wagner (CW) attack [10] is the state-of-the-art white-box
adversarial attack method, capable of producing misclassified
and visually imperceptible images, that manage to make de-
fensive distillation [30] ineffective against adversarial attacks.
The methods described above and many other methods
proposed by the scientific community [9], [31]–[33] pertain
to attacks done in a white-box setting, in which it is assumed
that the attacker has full knowledge and access to the ANN
image classifier. However, several researchers [11], [12] have
also shown that it is also possible to attack a model, without
the need of any knowledge of the targeted model (i.e. black-
box attacks). In [11], the authors used the decision made by
the targeted image classifier to perturb the input sample. In
[12], the authors made use of the concept of transferability of
adversarial samples across neural networks to attack the victim
classifier. Their method is a two-step process, which first
involves approximating the decision boundary of the targeted
classifier by training a surrogate model to convert a black-
box to a white-box problem. Next, they attack the surrogate
model in a white-box fashion thereafter launching the resultant
adversarial sample towards the targeted classifier. In the next
section, we describe the attacks we used in our work, exploring
both the white-box and black-box categories.
B. Attack Algorithms Used
To attack the model in a black-box setting, we used a
decision-based method known as Boundary Attack [11]. This
approach initialises itself by generating a starting sample that
is labelled as adversarial to the victim classifier. Following
which, random walks are taken by this sample along the
decision boundary that separates the correct and incorrect clas-
sification regions. These random walks will only be considered
valid if it fulfils two constraints, i) the resultant sample remains
adversarial and ii) the distance between the resultant sample
and the target is reduced. Essentially, this approach performs
rejection sampling such that it finds smaller valid adversarial
perturbations across the iterations.
We used the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [8] as one of the
means to perform white-box attacks. This method is basically
an iterative form of the FGSM attack which is represented as
such:
xt+1 = xt + α ∗ sign(∇J(F (xt), y; θ)) (1)
where ∇J represents the gradients of the loss calculated
with respect to the input space xt and its original label y,
t represents the iterations. This approach takes the sign of the
gradients, multiply it with a scaling factor α, and adding this
perturbation to the sample at the tth iteration.
The CW attack is a targeted attack strategy, in which an
objective function is optimised such that it yields a resultant
imperceptible image, while being labelled as an adversarial
class by the targeted image classifier. This image would
then be used to cause misclassification. More specifically, the
adversary has to solve the following objective function:
minδ||δ||2 + c · f(x+ δ) (2)
where the first term minimises the L2 norm of the perturbation
while the second term ensures misclassification. c is a constant.
This attack method is considered as state-of-the-art and can
still be used to bypass several detection mechanisms [34].
C. Spiking Neural Networks
1) MCSEFRON: MCSEFRON [20] is a two-layered SNN
that has time-dependent weights connecting between neurons.
It adopts the STDP learning rule and it trains based on
variations between the relative timings between the actual
and desired post-synaptic spike time. It encodes images into
spike trains via the same mechanism as [35], which involves
projecting the real-valued normalised image pixels (in [0,1])
onto multiple overlapping receptive fields (RF) represented by
Gaussians. After the training is done, it makes decisions based
on the earliest post-synaptic spikes while ignoring the rest.
2) SNNM : The Reward-modulated STDP (R-STDP) in
deep convolutional networks [29], referred to as SNNM , makes
use of three convolution layers, with the first two trained in
an unsupervised manner via STDP and the last convolution
trained via Reward-modulated STDP. The input images had
to be first preprocessed by six Difference of Gaussian (DoG)
filters, which were followed by the encoding into spike trains
by the intensity-to-latency [36] scheme. The SNNM does not
require any external classifiers as they used a neuron-based
decision-making trained via R-STDP in the final convolu-
tion layer. The R-STDP is based on reinforcement learning
concepts, where correct decisions will lead to STDP while
incorrect decisions will lead to anti-STDP.
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We used three datasets for our experiments, namely MNIST
[37], CIFAR-10 [38] and, Patch Camelyon [39] which we refer
to as PCam. The libraries we used in our experiments are
PyTorch [40] and SpykeTorch [41] for constructing our image
classifiers. For attacks, we used the Foolbox [42] library at
version 1.8.0.
A. Image Classification Baseline
In this work, we explored eight different variants and archi-
tectures of neural networks: ResNet18, MCSEFRON, SNNM ,
three BSN architectures and two BNN architectures. The
BSN architectures used are a 2-layered, 4-layered Multilayer
Perceptron, and a modified LeNet [43] which we will refer to
as BSN-2, BSN-4 and BSN-L respectively. For the BNNs,
we explored both deterministic and stochastic binarization
strategies, which we will refer to as BNN-D and BNN-S
respectively.
1) Training the Classifiers: For the ANN, we used the
ResNet18 [44] from PyTorch’s torchvision. We would like
to refer the reader to our supplementary materials for more
details regarding the hyperparameters we used for this model
and also for the other variants, that will be discussed in the
paragraphs below within this section.
For the case of MCSEFRON, we used five receptive fields
(RFs) and a learning rate of 0.1 for MNIST while using
three RFs and a learning rate of 0.5 for CIFAR-10. The other
hyperparameters were set at their default values. We used
the authors’ implementation of MCSEFRON in Python1 for
training. In training MCSEFRON, we performed sub-sampling
strategies on the training data. We used the first batch of
training data of CIFAR-10; we used the first 30000 samples
of PCam.
As mentioned in Section II, in the case of SNNM , the
model’s input images are preprocessed by the DoG filters. The
number of DoG filters used will determine the input channel
of the first convolution layer in SNNM . Hence, for a three-
channelled image (e.g. CIFAR-10), we first take the mean
of the channels to convert the images to a single channel,
prior to passing them to the DoG filters. Unfortunately for this
model, we could not find a suitable set of hyperparameters that
performs reasonably on the PCam dataset. While training, we
noticed that the outputs of the network was consistently the
same, regardless of the number of training iterations. Hence,
we could not report the Adversarial Success Rates (ASRs) and
their respective norms for the attacks against SNNM using the
PCam dataset.
For BSNs, we used a batch size of 128 and used Adam
optimizer for the BSN-4 and BSN-L variants while using
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) for BSN-2. The other
hyperparameters we used can be found in the supplementary
material. We adapted the code from this GitHub repository2,
with the network definition of the BSN-L architecture in
1https://github.com/nagadarshan-n/MC-SEFRON
2https://github.com/Wizaron/binary-stochastic-neurons
PyTorch requiring modification on all intermediate activations
with BSN modules.
For the BNNs, we used the same hyperparameters across the
various datasets and models and adapted the code from this
GitHub repository3, which was originally used by the authors
in [21]. We used a learning rate of 0.005 and weight decay
of 0.0001 with a batch size of 256. We also used the Adam
optimiser to train our models for 20 epochs in MNIST, 150
epochs in CIFAR-10 and 50 epochs in PCam. We manually set
the learning rate to 0.001 at epoch 101 and 0.0005 at epoch
142, following the authors in [21]. For BNN-D and BNN-
S, we used the ResNet18 architecture as the structure of the
network, while the binarization of the weights and activations
will only occur at the forward pass.
2) Baseline Classification Performance: The baseline im-
age classification performances are summarised in Table I. It
is evident that these results are not state-of-the-art. However,
getting the most optimal performance is not the focus of
this work. Having said that, we would like to highlight the
accuracy obtained for MCSEFRON on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
We hypothesise that the reason behind the significantly poor
performance is due to the inherent architecture of the model.
As MCSEFRON can be considered as a single layered neural
network without any convolution layers, its performance is
highly limited on more complex image datasets, like CIFAR-
10. In a prior work that studied the performance limitations of
models without convolutions [45], they managed to obtain an
accuracy of only approximately 52% to 57% on CIFAR-10,
using a deeper and more dense fully-connected neural network
(see Figure 4(a) in [45]).
TABLE I: Baseline image classification performances of the
various models. Metrics reported refers to the classification
accuracy.
MNIST CIFAR-10 PCam
Resnet18 0.988 0.842 0.789
MCSEFRON 0.861 0.372 0.671
SNNM 0.964 0.391 -
BSN-2 0.958 0.489 0.723
BSN-4 0.968 0.535 0.735
BSN-L 0.981 0.582 0.779
BNN-D 0.989 0.876 0.798
BNN-S 0.967 0.687 0.744
B. Modifying SNN implementation for Adversarial Attacks
As SNNs are inherently very different from conventional
ANNs, there is a need to adapt the original implementation of
the SNNs to fit our purposes. We made two modifications in
our work. First, because there might be instances in which non-
differentiable operations were performed (i.e sign function),
when adapting such SNNs for our use, we replaced the built-in
sign functions with our custom sign function, which performs
the same operation but allows gradients to pass through in a
straight through fashion in the backward pass. This ensures
that the gradients are non-zeros everywhere. Also, since we
3https://github.com/itayhubara/BinaryNet.pytorch
examined SNNs that were trained via STDP, such a change
does not violate the learning rule of the SNNs. Furthermore, as
we are only interested in the behaviour of such models when
faced with adversarial samples, we extracted the critical parts
of the network (i.e decision-making forward pass) only in our
adaptation.
Secondly, as SNNs make decisions based on either earliest
spike times or maximum internal potentials, their outputs
are more commonly a single valued integer, depicting the
predicted class. However, for attacks to be done on such
networks, we require logits of networks. Hence, we simulated
logits in our modification by using the post-synaptic spike
times for the case of MCSEFRON and the potentials for the
case of SNNM for all of the classes. When spike times were
used, we took the negative of spike times so that the max of
the vector of spike times correspond to the actual prediction.
C. White-box Attacks Against Neural Networks
We report the proportion of adversarial samples that are suc-
cessful in causing misclassification and term it as Adversarial
Success Rate (ASR; in range [0,1]). Furthermore, we report the
mean L2 norms per pixel of the differences between natural
images and their adversarial counterparts. We derived that
metric by dividing the L2 norm by the total number of pixels
in the image. In our experiments, we sub-sampled 500 samples
from the test set of the respective datasets during the evaluation
of the BIM attack and 100 samples for the evaluation of
the other attacks. We performed sub-sampling due to the
computational intractability of performing the attacks on the
entire dataset. Note that we only selected samples that were
originally classified correctly while ignoring the rest.
1) Basic Iterative Method (BIM): For the BIM attack, we
varied the attack strength (symbolised by ǫ measured in L∞
space) while keeping the step sizes and iterations fixed at
0.05 and 100 respectively. We explored ǫ values of 8/255,
16/255 and 32/255 in our experiments, showing the results of
ǫ = 32/255 while the rest can be found in our supplementary
materials.
For an initial sanity check, one may inspect Figure 1. The
BIM attack has one parameter, attack strength ǫ. One can ob-
serve an intuitively reasonable trade-off of adversarial success
rate (ASR) versus L2 norm of the distance of the adversarial
samples to the original inputs, as the ǫ values vary according
to ǫ = 8/255, 16/255, 32/255, 64/255, 96/255, 126/255.
Two notable observations can be made about BIM from
Tables IIa and IIb: Firstly, when comparing vulnerability
of different networks against BIM, spiking neural networks,
with the exception of MCSEFRON on CIFAR-10, tend to
be the most robust. Secondly, when comparing attacks for a
given architectures, BIM yields the highest ASR on binarized
stochastic networks of all attacks, however this is achieved at
the cost of L2-norms which are multiples of all other methods.
2) Carlini & Wagner L2 (CWL2): For the CWL2 attack,
we used the default attack parameters as specified in Foolbox.
Exemplified by the results from ResNet18 in Table IIa, the
CWL2 attack is an extremely powerful attack that manages
TABLE II: Adversarial success rate (Table (a)) and mean L2 norms per pixel (Table (b)) for the attacks. For stochastic ANNs, an
average of five runs were taken. ǫ is the attack strength for BIM attack. 500 samples were taken for BIM attacked experiments
while 100 samples were sampled in non-BIM attacked experiments. The default attack parameters were used as defined by
Foolbox except for the case of ModCWL2, where K in Equation 3 was defined as 50.
(a) ASR (in [0,1]) of the different variants of models.
Dataset Attack Method Resnet18 SNNM MCSEFRON BSN-2 BSN-4 BSN-L BNN-D BNN-S
MNIST
BIM 1.000 0.120 0.294 0.774 0.874 0.506 1.000 0.566
CWL2 0.970 0.620 0.420 0.204 0.180 0.010 0.980 0.030
ModCWL2 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.334 0.308 0.232 1.000 0.370
Boundary 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.980 0.030
CIFAR-10
BIM 1.000 0.694 0.998 0.981 0.955 0.884 1.000 0.953
CWL2 1.000 0.990 0.990 0.402 0.200 0.234 1.000 0.142
ModCWL2 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.528 0.226 0.230 1.000 0.188
Boundary 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.290 0.182 0.192 0.944 0.114
PCam
BIM 1.000 - 0.534 0.920 0.912 0.772 0.974 0.910
CWL2 1.000 - 0.280 0.168 0.112 0.102 0.92 0.126
ModCWL2 1.000 - 0.800 0.138 0.144 0.152 0.930 0.114
Boundary 0.730 - 1.000 0.102 0.068 0.080 0.190 0.000
(b) Mean L2 norms per pixel between the original image and its perturbed adversarial image of the different variants of models. Note that
the values reported have been scaled up by a factor of 1000, purely for illustration purposes only.
Dataset Attack Method Resnet18 SNNM MCSEFRON BSN-2 BSN-4 BSN-L BNN-D BNN-S
MNIST
BIM 2.1667 2.4142 1.4126 2.6164 2.2969 2.5716 1.5606 2.1711
CWL2 0.9057 3.5731 0.5137 2.7403 2.5473 1.0335 0.0000 2.2963
ModCWL2 5.8529 7.7747 4.6039 8.6806 9.0173 9.5389 0.2909 9.9991
Boundary 1.3986 10.7922 3.4964 1.2268 1.3307 0.8380 0.0000 0.1485
CIFAR-10
BIM 0.9318 1.3968 0.8924 1.1667 0.9829 1.0891 0.9606 1.0494
CWL2 0.0782 0.5601 0.0724 0.0874 0.0187 0.0059 0.0376 0.0507
ModCWL2 0.1102 0.4354 0.0766 0.9369 0.0244 0.0163 0.0640 0.0590
Boundary 0.1346 2.3423 2.2432 1.9463 0.0000 0.0776 1.1771 0.1411
PCam
BIM 0.9794 - 1.4248 0.9110 0.9179 1.0017 1.0343 0.9888
CWL2 0.0870 - 0.7915 0.0954 0.2124 0.1738 0.1001 0.2636
ModCWL2 0.1367 - 3.2671 0.0535 0.1422 0.2458 0.1384 0.2213
Boundary 0.0856 - 3.1918 0.2154 0.0146 0.0013 2.0002 -
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Fig. 1: Plot of ASR against the mean L2 distortion per pixel
when varying ǫ values on the MNIST dataset using the BIM
attack. Targeted models were MCSEFRON and SNNM . The
mean L2 distortion per pixel has been scaled up by a factor
of 1000 for illustration purposes only.
to fool the model almost all of the time. However, this attack
is not very effective against stochastic ANNs. As shown in
Table IIa, stochastic ANNs only has a maximum ASR of 0.402
on the CIFAR-10 dataset for the BSN-2 model and a minimum
of 0.01 ASR for BSN-L model on MNIST. Although this
attack method is known to be state-of-the-art in generating
successful adversarial samples with the least perturbation,
its efficacy drops significantly when faced with such model
variants.
D. Black-box Attacks Against Neural Networks
1) Boundary Attack: The results in Table IIa shows that
the effectiveness of the attack does not differ greatly among
susceptible models, likewise among less susceptible models.
Interestingly, the Boundary attack performs exceptionally well
in terms of ASR against deterministic models, i.e. ResNet18,
SNNs and BNN-D. Whereas for the stochastic ANNs, this
attack method is much less efficient in finding adversarial
samples. It even failed to find any for the case of BNN-S for
the PCam dataset. This observation indicates that the attack
method does not depend greatly on the architecture of the
model but instead, on the nature of the model.
In the case of deterministic models, the decision boundary
remains stable after training due to its fixed weights and
activations for the same input sample. On the other hand,
for stochastic ANNs, its weights and activations will vary
based on a probability distribution, resulting in slightly varied
predictions for the same sample at different times. Having a
stochastic decision boundary will compromise the ability to
obtain accurate feedback for the traversal of adversarial sample
candidates which explains the poor performance of this attack.
E. Augmented Carlini & Wagner L2 Attack Against Neural
Networks
Given the relatively poor ASR obtained by CWL2 and
Boundary attacks against stochastic ANNs, we wonder
whether a potential attacker may utilise randomness in aug-
menting input samples in the attack procedure to create
attacks which result in samples further away from the decision
boundary and thus are able to mislead stochastic ANNs. Recall
that the CWL2 attack involves solving the objective function
as defined in Equation 2. We modify this function to include
an additional term that performs random augmentations on
the input image, both rotations and translations, and then
optimising it. Equation 3 formulates our modified attack,
ModCWL2.
minδ||δ||2 + c · f(x+ δ) +
1
K
K∑
i=1
f(R(x+ δ)) (3)
where K is the number of iterations to perform random
transformations, symbolised by R(.), on the input sample.
Our function R(.) involves first making random rotations
followed by random translations. In this work, we defined the
allowable range of rotation angles to 180 degrees clockwise
and counterclockwise, sampled from a uniform distribution.
Also, we select at random the translation direction and pixels
(integer from 0 to 10) to be applied on the image.
This modification will induce a trade-off between resultant
L2 norms and ASR. One can understand it in the following
way: performing K times random transformations R will turn
a single sample x into a cluster of K samples. Moving the
cluster as a whole over the decision boundary requires a larger
step than moving a single sample, depending on the radius of
the cluster.
Figure 2 illustrates a boxplot of the CWL2 and ModCWL2
attacks’ ASR and norms. The ModCWL2 is more consistent
than CWL2 in achieving a higher ASR, based on the lower
Inter-Quartile Range (IQR) and a much higher median and
mean for ModCWL2, across the targeted models. More specif-
ically, the IQR of the ASR of the CWL2 and ModCWL2
attacks are 0.82 and 0.772 respectively. The ModCWL2 attack
has a higher median of 0.528 as compared to CWL2 with
median 0.28. However, it is clear that the difference between
the original and adversarial samples is much greater and
more varied for the case of ModCWL2. The IQR of the
norms of the CWL2 and ModCWL2 attacks are 0.0773 and
0.514 respectively. The ModCWL2 attack has a slightly higher
median of 0.0246 as compared to CWL2 with median 0.0174.
In total, out of 12 configurations of stochastic networks in
Table IIa, ModCWL2 performs better in 9 configurations and
worse in 3 configurations compared to CWL2 in terms of ASR.
F. Transferability of Adversarial Samples
In this section, we discuss the transferability of adversarial
samples derived from the vanilla ResNet18 to other architec-
tures. This is a plausible scenario, arising when the attacker
CWL2
(ASR)
ModCWL2
(ASR)
CWL2
(Norms)
ModCWL2
(Norms)
Attack variants
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
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Fig. 2: Boxplot of the ASR and mean L2 norms per pixel that
we obtained in our experiments (taken from Tables IIa and
IIb). Note that the L2 norms reported here are scaled up by a
factor of 100.
chooses a CNN (i.e. ResNet18) as target for adversarial
attacks, since it is the most commonly used neural network
variant. He or she then generates adversarial samples from the
CNN, and launches them against the actual target model which
is based on a different architecture. In this work, we evaluate
this transferability phenomenon on the MNIST dataset as
their corresponding baseline classification models achieved the
lowest test error rates and it is the common dataset that is
applicable across all models. We chose a subset of network
variants instead of the full range of models in this set of
experiments as we ignored repetitive variants and also variants
already highly susceptible to the standard mode of attacks.
We draw the following observations based on Table III.
Firstly, we observe highest transferability rates for MCSE-
FRON and, in particular, for BNN-S. For the latter, one may
postulate that it is due to the similar base architectures between
BNN-S and ResNet18 as BNN-S uses ResNet18 as a structure
while replacing components with binarized and stochastic
counterparts.
Secondly, for SNNM and BSN-L model variants and attack
types not including ModCWL2, the success rate is low, thereby
showing a certain robustness of SNNM and BSN-L against
direct transfer attacks. We consider it an important contribution
of our study, demanding further investigation.
A third observation is that ModCWL2 performs well across
all architectures when compared to the other attacks. This
result shows another strength of ModCWL2. Only with BNN-
S, it is clearly outperformed by BIM.
IV. ATTACKING STOCHASTIC ARCHITECTURE MIXTURES
In the previous sections, we observed that several net-
work architectures appear to be moderately robust against
transferability attacks. Inspired by this, a defender could
employ stochastic switching of a mixture of neural networks
with differing architectures to circumvent adversarial attack
attempts. To do this, at inference time the defender chooses
at random a neural network to be used to evaluate the input
sample. This is a special case of drawing a distribution over
TABLE III: Transferability rate of the resultant adversarial samples generated from ResNet18 using various attack types on
MNIST. Only adversarial samples successful against ResNet18 were considered. A higher rate indicates a more successful
misclassification attempt of the generated adversarial samples from the ResNet18 transferred to the respective targeted models.
Attack method ǫ MCSEFRON SNNM BSN-L BNN-S
BIM
8/255 0.2190 0.0000 0.0556 0.3450
16/255 0.3210 0.0101 0.0453 0.3560
32/255 0.3200 0.0080 0.0600 0.4460
64/255 0.3380 0.0060 0.0480 0.4340
128/255 0.3380 0.0060 0.0760 0.4500
CWL2 - 0.0211 0.0000 0.0206 0.0938
ModCWL2 - 0.3100 0.2600 0.2600 0.2800
Boundary - 0.2000 0.0000 0.0100 0.2200
TABLE IV: ASR (in [0,1]) against selected ensemble of
architectures for the BIM attacks taken at ǫ = 32/255, for
both MNIST and CIFAR-10. 100 samples were sampled in
each experiment.
ResNet18 +
BSN-L
ResNet18 +
BNN-S
ResNet18 +
BSN-L +
BNN-S
MNIST 0.17 0.08 0.12
CIFAR-10 0.78 0.78 0.64
networks from e.g. a Dirichlet prior. We explore three different
selected combinations of ensembles, 1) ResNet18 with BSN-
L, 2) ResNet18 with BNN-S, and 3) ResNet18 with BSN-
L and BNN-S. Here, we investigate the ASR in attacking
against such ensembles. In our experiments, we applied the
BIM attack due to its good performance against stochastic
networks, using the mean of the gradients with respect to
the input across the ensemble of models, with an attack
strength chosen at ǫ = 32/255. This is inspired by [46]. While
they considered ensembles of CNNs, we explore a stochastic
mixture of differing architectures.
One can compare the results from Table IV for MNIST
against Table III. Table III permits to estimate the ASR
of a transferability attack against a stochastic mixture. For
example, using a transferability attack against a (0.5, 0.5)-
mixture of ResNet18 and BSN-L would result in an ASR of
0.5 ·1+0.5 ·0.06 = 0.53. Surprisingly we can see that directly
attacking stochastic mixtures seems to perform poorly, at least
for MNIST. As for BSN-L, transferability would result in an
ASR of 0.5 · 1 + 0.5 · 0.446 = 0.723, which is much better
than the observed 0.12 in Table III. This raises the question
whether such robustness of stochastic mixtures holds also for
other datasets and larger neural networks, or whether more
efficient attacks can be designed against stochastic mixtures.
V. DISCUSSION
One notable observation is that stochastic networks are
almost equally very vulnerable as CNNs, when BIM is used
with sufficient strength. It is the simplest of all considered
attacks. Its advantage for stochastic networks is that it does
not attempt to stay close to the decision boundary as explicitly
enforced in boundary attacks, and implicitly enforced by
CWL2 attacks where the regulariser term attempts to keep the
adversarial close to the initial sample. For stochastic networks
the decision boundary is defined only in an expected sense.
Staying close to expected decision boundary results in a higher
failure rate of adversarials. The simplicity of BIM allows it to
take larger steps across the expected decision boundary.
Another observation is that transferability across architec-
tures is limited, which calls for further investigation of non-
averaged combination of different architectures.
VI. CONCLUSION
We performed adversarial attacks on a wide variety of
models (e.g. SNNs, BSNs, BNNs), across different datasets
namely MNIST, CIFAR-10 and PCam in the raw input
image space, with the goal of investigating the adversarial
robustness of alternative variants of neural networks. We note
that there exists alternative variants of neural networks (i.e.
stochastic ANNs) that are vulnerable to the simple BIM and
moderately robust against more elaborate adversarial attacks
than conventional ANNs. It is a partially positive result that
stochastic networks are more robust against elaborate attacks.
Unfortunately, detecting a stochastic network by its outputs is
trivial.
Given the above, we were motivated to modify a state-of-
the-art CWL2 attack, in order to investigate the robustness
of such models against this modified attack. We found that
our modification do increase the ASR against such model
variants substantially, though incurring higher L2 norms in
adversarial perturbations. We also analysed the hypothetical
scenario whereby the attacker is unsure of the targeted image
classifier and thus attempt a transferability attack based on
a conventional ANN (i.e. ResNet18). We found that such
an attack strategy would be highly ineffective, if there is an
architecture mismatch between the source and target models.
Finally, we question the success of adversarial attacks should
an ensemble utilising a stochastic switch of networks for in-
ference be employed, and found that though ASR do decrease,
the change in MNIST is more pronounced than that of CIFAR-
10, which calls for further investigation.
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APPENDIX
We provide more details regarding the training of our
classifiers, attack results for stochastic ANNs, transferability
experiments. Furthermore, we provide experimental results
of an alternate black-box attack proposed by [28] and also
adversarial images of the different attacks against different
model variants.
A. Details on Image Classifier Training
1) ResNet18: We trained the MNIST model for 20 epochs
from scratch while loading pre-trained versions of ResNet18
(trained on ImageNet) and fine-tuning them for CIFAR10 and
PCam. We selected the best performing set of weights based
on the test dataset. For the case of MNIST, where the images
are single channelled, we had to replace the initial convolution
layer with one that has a input channel of 1 instead of 3, since
the original model on torchvision was trained on ImageNet.
During training, we performed data augmentation on the
training set and also normalised the data to between 0 and
1. For the case of CIFAR10 and PCam, we then performed
colour normalisation by subtracting the mean and scaling to
unit variance using the mean and standard deviation calculated
from a subset of 50000 training samples from each dataset
respectively. We did not perform any colour normalisation for
MNIST.
TABLE V: Hyperparameters used for training the ResNet18
model.
MNIST CIFAR10 PCam
Optimiser SGD Adam [47] Adam
Learning Rate (LR) 0.001 0.001 0.001
Weight decay (WD) 0.00001 0.0001 0.0001
LR decay step (Step) 5 3 3
LR decay factor (γ) 0.5 0.95 0.95
Batch size (BS) 128 256 256
2) Mozafari et al. (SNNm): The training code for SNNm
that we used was adopted from the SpykeTorch [41] library,
following the tutorial provided. Each convolution layer was
trained independently and chronologically via the STDP learn-
ing rule. For the last convolution layer, Reward-STDP was
used instead where correct decisions were rewarded while
incorrect decisions were punished. More details about the
training procedure can be found in [29]. Table VI describes
the hyperparameters we used and other hyperparameters that
were not mentioned here indicates that the default values were
used.
3) Binary Stochastic Neuron Models: We performed the
similar preprocessing steps as described in A1. For our BSN
models, we used the Straight-Through (ST) estimator in the
backpropagation of the gradients. Slope annealing was done
in conjunction with the ST estimator for the BSN-2 and BSN-
4 variants only. More details about the slope annealing trick
can be found in [48]. Table VII summarises some of the
hyperparameters that we used in our experiments for the BSNs.
As mentioned in the main text, we used a batch size of 128
across the settings and used Adam optimiser for the BSN-4
and BSN-L variants while using SGD for BSN-2.
Recall that BSN-2 indicates a simple 2-layered Multi-layer
Perceptron (MLP) while BSN-4 indicates a 4-layered MLP
variant. The difference between the standard MLP and our
BSN here is that all hidden activations are modified to perform
binarization of activations in a stochastic manner.
B. Full Experiment Results for BIM Attacks
Tables Xa and Xb shows the experiment results we obtained
when we vary the attack strength for the BIM attack. We used
three different values of ǫ, namely 8/255, 16/255 and 32/255.
It is clear that BNN-D is highly susceptible to even the simple
adversarial attacks with low attack strength, as the ASR for
BNN-D is higher than that of ResNet18 while having lower
L2 norms per pixel at ǫ = 8/255.
C. Full Experiment Results for Stochastic ANNs
Tables XI and XII summarises the full results we obtained
for the case of stochastic ANNs, which includes the mean and
standard deviation (STD) across 5 runs of the same experiment
settings each. As we can observe from the relatively low
standard deviations in the tables, the results we obtained for
the stochastic ANNs are consistent. A ‘-’ was indicated for the
case of Boundary attack on BNN-S due to the unsuccessful
attempt in finding adversarial samples.
D. Transferability Experiment Results
Table XIV shows the full experiment results we obtained
from the transferability experiments. This is a replica of
Table 3 in the main paper and it is presented here again
for easy referencing only. Based on Tables XIIIa and XIIIb,
there was a reasonable amount of valid adversarial samples
generated from ResNet18 that are launched towards the other
model variants since they yield a high ASR. Recall that we
have 500 samples for BIM and 100 samples for the other attack
variants.
E. Performing Surrogate-based Black-box Attacks
In this section, we describe our attempt in performing
another method of another black-box attack, as proposed by
[28]. In short, this method is a two-step process; first, it
involves training a surrogate model based on a very small
subset of unseen data, whereby the ground truth label will
be derived from the target classifier (called the oracle). The
surrogate’s purpose is to approximate the decision boundary of
the targeted classifier as close as possible. Once the surrogate
TABLE VI: Hyperparameters used for training SNNm. Threshold of ∞ indicates that the maximum value was taken.
Dataset Layer No. of feature maps Kernel window Threshold
MNIST
1st conv 30 (5,5,6) 15
2nd conv 250 (3,3,30) 10
3rd conv 200 (5,5,250) ∞
CIFAR10
1st conv 300 (5,5,6) 15
2nd conv 800 (3,3,300) 10
3rd conv 500 (5,5,800) ∞
TABLE VII: Hyperparameters used for training the BSNs.
BSN-2 BSN-4 BSN-L
MNIST CIFAR10 PCam MNIST CIFAR10 PCam MNIST CIFAR10 PCam
LR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.01
WD 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6 1E-5 0.0001 0.0001
Step 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 50 5
γ 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75
TABLE VIII: Dimensions of the Fully Connected (FC) layers
for the BSN-2 model across the datasets.
MNIST CIFAR10 PCam
Input layer 784 3072 3072
Hidden layer 100 100 100
Output layer 10 10 2
TABLE IX: Dimensions of the Fully Connected (FC) layers
for the BSN-4 model across the datasets.
MNIST CIFAR10 PCam
Input layer 784 3072 3072
Hidden layer 1 600 2000 2000
Hidden layer 2 400 750 750
Hidden layer 3 200 100 100
Output layer 10 10 2
has been trained, white-box attacks can be performed on this
surrogate, since it exists locally with respect to the attacker.
Thus, this converts a black-box to a white-box problem, which
makes it significantly easier to launch attacks. We refer the
reader to the work done in [28] for more details about the
exact methodology.
In our experiments, we used a ResNet18 model as the
surrogate architecture, while considering three different model
variants as our target classifier (i.e. oracle), namely BSN-L,
BNN-S and MCSEFRON. We evaluated on both the MNIST
and CIFAR-10 datasets, taking 20% of the test data to be used
for training the surrogate, and also performing the Jacobian-
based Data Augmentation mentioned in [28] for finding more
data points during the training of the surrogate. The remain-
ing test data were used to evaluate the performance of the
surrogate models.
As illustrated in Table XV, the ModCWL2 attack con-
sistently achieve a higher transferability rate as compared
to the vanilla CWL2 attack, which is also consistent with
our explanation provided in the main text under the section
“Augmented Carlini & Wagner L2 Attack Against Neural
Networks”. Another observation is that the BIM attack is
in general more efficient in attaining transferable adversarial
samples than the other more complex attack methods. This
observation, together with the results in TableXIV, suggests
that iterative attacks are better performing for attacks involving
transferability.
F. Adversarial Images of Various Attacks Across Datasets and
Models
Here, we illustrate some sample adversarial images, com-
pared to their original counterparts, for the different attacks
and also against the various targeted models in Figure 3.
We only show images from the MNIST dataset as they
are the most relatable among the three datasets. The first
column shows the original image that was used to construct
the respective adversarial samples. The subsequent columns
represent the different attack methods while the rows represent
the different model variants. Below each image, there is a
label that indicates what the predicted label was based on the
corresponding model.
TABLE X: Adversarial success rate and mean L2 norms per pixel for the BIM attack. For stochastic ANNs, an average of
five runs were taken.
(a) ASR (in [0,1]) of the different variants of models. Step size of 0.05 and 100 iterations were performed. 500 samples were sampled for
this experiment.
Attack strength, ǫ Dataset Resnet18 SNNm MCSEFRON BSN-2 BSN-4 BSN-L BNN-D BNN-S
8/255
MNIST 0.190 0.026 0.054 0.099 0.172 0.038 0.992 0.196
CIFAR10 0.990 0.358 0.980 0.944 0.941 0.706 1.000 0.851
PCam 0.944 - 0.244 0.826 0.772 0.468 0.859 0.754
16/255
MNIST 0.796 0.056 0.156 0.336 0.585 0.129 1.000 0.375
CIFAR10 1.000 0.534 0.998 0.977 0.964 0.852 1.000 0.951
PCam 0.974 - 0.416 0.912 0.879 0.669 0.926 0.857
32/255
MNIST 1.000 0.120 0.294 0.774 0.874 0.506 1.000 0.566
CIFAR10 1.000 0.694 0.998 0.981 0.955 0.884 1.000 0.953
PCam 1.000 - 0.534 0.920 0.912 0.772 0.974 0.910
(b) Mean L2 norms per pixel between the original image and its perturbed adversarial image of the different variants of models. Note that
the values reported have been scaled up by a factor of 1000.
Attack strength, ǫ Dataset Resnet18 SNNm MCSEFRON BSN-2 BSN-4 BSN-L BNN-D BNN-S
8/255
MNIST 0.8301 0.8201 0.4681 0.8386 0.8634 0.7615 0.8289 0.8125
CIFAR10 0.5524 0.5338 0.5581 0.5221 0.5239 0.4606 0.5483 0.5234
PCam 0.5530 - 0.5324 0.5277 0.5402 0.4907 0.5461 0.5453
16/255
MNIST 1.4925 1.4212 0.9072 1.5716 1.5529 1.4866 1.3604 1.4353
CIFAR10 0.8809 0.9129 0.8866 0.8745 0.8548 0.7619 0.8767 0.8462
PCam 0.8452 - 0.8600 0.8345 0.8516 0.8058 0.8698 0.8680
32/255
MNIST 2.1667 2.4142 1.4126 2.6164 2.2969 2.5716 1.5606 2.1711
CIFAR10 0.9318 1.3968 0.8924 1.1667 0.9829 1.0891 0.9606 1.0494
PCam 0.9794 - 1.4248 0.9110 0.9179 1.0017 1.0343 0.9888
TABLE XI: ASR and mean L2 norms per pixel for the BIM attack on the stochastic ANNs. Note that for each experiment,
we took the average and standard deviation across 5 runs of the same setting.
(a) ASR (in range[0,1]) across the different datasets for stochastic ANNs.
ǫ Dataset BSN-2 BSN-4 BSN-L BNN-S
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
8/255
MNIST 0.0992 0.0085 0.1724 0.0107 0.0384 0.0082 0.1960 0.0108
CIFAR10 0.9440 0.0107 0.9408 0.0100 0.7056 0.0237 0.8508 0.0118
PCam 0.8256 0.0117 0.7720 0.0049 0.4680 0.0164 0.7540 0.0022
16/255
MNIST 0.3356 0.0204 0.5852 0.0084 0.1288 0.0138 0.3748 0.0231
CIFAR10 0.9772 0.0056 0.9644 0.0077 0.8524 0.0118 0.9512 0.0084
PCam 0.9120 0.0111 0.8788 0.0081 0.6688 0.0169 0.8568 0.0081
32/255
MNIST 0.7736 0.0097 0.8740 0.0116 0.5056 0.0132 0.5656 0.0289
CIFAR10 0.9812 0.0020 0.9552 0.0106 0.8840 0.0131 0.9532 0.0111
PCam 0.9204 0.0098 0.9116 0.0114 0.7724 0.0135 0.9100 0.0097
(b) Mean L2 norms per pixel between the original samples and their adversarial counterparts, across the different datasets for stochastic
ANNs. Note that the metrics reported here are scaled up by a factor of 1000.
ǫ Dataset BSN-2 BSN-4 BSN-L BNN-S
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
8/255
MNIST 0.8386 0.0196 0.8634 0.0104 0.7615 0.0411 0.8125 0.0074
CIFAR10 0.5221 0.0038 0.5239 0.0034 0.4606 0.0051 0.5234 0.0026
PCam 0.5277 0.0035 0.5402 0.0055 0.4907 0.0055 0.5453 0.0027
16/255
MNIST 1.5716 0.0108 1.5529 0.0094 1.4866 0.0122 1.4353 0.0113
CIFAR10 0.8745 0.0043 0.8548 0.0086 0.7619 0.0068 0.8462 0.0063
PCam 0.8345 0.0093 0.8516 0.0115 0.8058 0.0039 0.8680 0.0047
32/255
MNIST 2.6164 0.0175 2.2969 0.0063 2.5716 0.0216 2.1711 0.0135
CIFAR10 1.1667 0.0074 0.9829 0.0136 1.0891 0.0147 1.0494 0.0091
PCam 0.9110 0.0035 0.9179 0.0072 1.0017 0.0119 0.9888 0.0053
TABLE XII: ASR and mean L2 norms per pixel for the other attack variants on the stochastic ANNs. Note that for each
experiment, we took the average and standard deviation across 5 runs of the same setting.
(a) ASR (in range[0,1]) across the different datasets for stochastic ANNs.
Model Dataset CWL2 ModCWL2 Boundary
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
BSN-2
MNIST 0.2040 0.0492 0.3340 0.0463 0.0080 0.0040
CIFAR10 0.4020 0.0354 0.5280 0.0117 0.2900 0.0636
PCam 0.1680 0.0194 0.1380 0.0040 0.1020 0.0382
BSN-4
MNIST 0.1800 0.0352 0.3080 0.0412 0.0140 0.0080
CIFAR10 0.2000 0.0329 0.2260 0.0377 0.1820 0.0223
PCam 0.1120 0.0331 0.1440 0.0403 0.0680 0.0248
BSN-L
MNIST 0.0100 0.0110 0.2320 0.0371 0.0120 0.0117
CIFAR10 0.2340 0.0350 0.2300 0.0374 0.1920 0.0299
PCam 0.1020 0.0319 0.1520 0.0325 0.0800 0.0167
BNN-S
MNIST 0.0300 0.0126 0.3700 0.0385 0.0300 0.0110
CIFAR10 0.1420 0.0279 0.1880 0.0232 0.1140 0.0377
PCam 0.1260 0.0185 0.1140 0.0258 - -
(b) Mean L2 norms per pixel between the original samples and their adversarial counterparts, across the different datasets for stochastic
ANNs. Note that the metrics reported here are scaled up by a factor of 1000.
Model Dataset CWL2 ModCWL2 Boundary
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
BSN-2
MNIST 2.7403 0.2163 8.6806 0.2813 1.2268 2.0642
CIFAR10 0.0874 0.0120 0.9369 0.1156 1.9463 0.2299
PCam 0.0954 0.0189 0.0535 0.0203 0.2154 0.3932
BSN-4
MNIST 2.5473 0.2728 9.0173 0.2855 1.3307 1.6021
CIFAR10 0.0187 0.0109 0.0244 0.0121 0.0635 0.0687
PCam 0.2124 0.0399 0.1422 0.0484 0.0146 0.0164
BSN-L
MNIST 0.0008 0.0007 9.5389 0.1533 0.8897 0.7185
CIFAR10 0.0059 0.0026 0.0163 0.0061 0.0776 0.0516
PCam 0.1738 0.0476 0.2458 0.1237 0.0013 0.0013
BNN-S
MNIST 2.2963 1.4531 9.9991 0.2580 0.1485 0.0726
CIFAR10 0.0507 0.0147 0.0590 0.0193 0.1411 0.1388
PCam 0.2636 0.0557 0.2213 0.0500 - -
TABLE XIII: ASR (in range [0,1]) of the respective attacks against ResNet18.
(a) BIM attack. ASR based on 500 samples.
ǫ = 8/255 ǫ = 16/255 ǫ = 32/255
MNIST CIFAR10 PCam MNIST CIFAR10 PCam MNIST CIFAR10 PCam
0.19 0.998 0.944 0.796 1 0.974 1 1 1
(b) Other attack variants. ASR based on 100 samples.
CWL2 ModCWL2 Boundary
MNIST 0.97 1 1
CIFAR10 1 1 1
PCam 1 1 0.73
TABLE XIV: Transferability rate of the resultant adversarial samples generated from ResNet18. Only adversarial samples
successful against ResNet18 were considered. A higher rate indicates a more successful misclassification attempt of transferred
samples to their respective targeted models.
Attack method ǫ MCSEFRON SNNm BSN-L BNN-S
BIM
8/255 0.219 0 0.0556 0.345
16/255 0.321 0.0101 0.0453 0.356
32/255 0.32 0.008 0.06 0.446
64/255 0.338 0.006 0.048 0.434
128/255 0.338 0.006 0.076 0.45
CWL2 - 0.0211 0 0.0206 0.0938
ModCWL2 - 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.28
Boundary - 0.2 0 0.01 0.22
Fig. 3: Sample adversarial images from the different attack methods against the different variants of neural networks on the
MNIST dataset.
TABLE XV: Transferability rates of the successful adversarial
samples on the ResNet18 model when launched against the
respective oracles. 100 samples were used for each experiment.
For the BIM attack, ǫ = 32/255 was used as the attack
strength throughout.
Dataset Attack Method
Oracle
BSN-L BNN-S MCSEFRON
MNIST
BIM 0.1717 0.4900 0.3367
CWL2 0.0106 0.0225 0.1098
ModCWL2 0.3200 0.1800 0.3900
CIFAR-10
BIM 0.6300 0.3367 0.7300
CWL2 0.2747 0.1939 0.6588
ModCWL2 0.3100 0.2100 0.6200
